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Policy Brief
August 2013
Saudi Aramco as a national development 
agent: recent shifts
 Executive summary
By Steffen Hertog
Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, Saudi Aramco, has been a critical agent for the social, 
economic and infrastructural development of Saudi Arabia; its managerial capacities are unri-
valled in the Kingdom – and, indeed, the Gulf region. After it played a rather limited role outside 
the hydrocarbons sector in the 1980s and 1990s, its range of tasks and ambitions has recently 
again expanded drastically into a number of new policy sectors, including heavy industry, 
 renewable energy, educational reform, infrastructure-building and general industrial develop-
ment. This presents both opportunities and risks for Aramco, which has started to operate far 
outside its traditional politically insulated “turf” of running the upstream oil and gas infrastruc-
ture in the Kingdom. It is now involved in activities that are more political and more closely 
scrutinised by the Saudi public, and will have to build up new institutional and political capa-
cities to maintain its reputation for clean and efficient management.      
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This presents both opportunities and risks for Aramco, 
which has started to operate far outside its traditional 
“turf” of running the upstream oil and gas sector in the 
Kingdom, and is now involved in activities that are more 
political and more closely scrutinised by the Saudi public.
Saudi Aramco has not only been in charge of the assets 
that generate more than 85% of Saudi exports and more 
than 90% of government revenue. Since its creation as a 
U.S. concessionaire in the 1930s it has also contributed to 
building important parts of the Saudi private sector through 
its contracting efforts and local business development 
programme. Although its early role in national develop-
ment is subject to some dispute, it has played an important 
part in building Saudi infrastructure, especially in the 
strategic Eastern Province, and in training an advanced 
industrial and managerial workforce. Many former Aram-
cons have used their experience with the company to join 
the ranks of Saudi entrepreneurs.
Differently from other national oil companies, Aramco was 
taken over from its original U.S. owners in the 1970s in a 
comparatively smooth fashion. It has retained its U.S. 
corporate culture, although it has been 100% government 
owned since 1980 and is run mostly by Saudis. It is now 
generally ranked as the most efficient national oil company 
among all Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) countries.
Saudi Aramco has retained a rather high level of opera-
tional autonomy since it became state owned. It has also 
retained its cultural autonomy and remains an enclave in 
whose compounds genders are allowed to mix and women 
can drive. While the company discloses little information – 
a stance it has arguably developed as a self-defence 
mechanism – it is generally seen as the most efficient part 
of the Saudi public sector. Senior royals have been instru-
mental in protecting it from predation or meddling by 
either the national bureaucracy or the wider ruling family.
Differently from some other Gulf monarchies, no royals 
hold any senior positions in Aramco and the minister of 
petroleum and mineral affairs, himself a former Aramco 
man, is also a commoner. While two important royals are 
deputies in the Ministry of Petroleum, their portfolios are 
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rather clearly delimited and they tend not to get directly 
involved in company affairs. In the past, the powerful (royal) 
governor of the Eastern Province reportedly intervened in 
some Aramco land and contracting issues, but he was 
dismissed in early 2013.
The Supreme Petroleum Council, the highest body deter-
mining oil and gas policy in Saudi Arabia, is chaired by the 
king and contains several royal ministers. But while it signs 
off major policy initiatives, most policy research and 
strategic proposals emerge from within Aramco; even the 
Ministry of Petroleum mostly relies on Aramco for research 
and remains a comparatively slim institution with limited 
autonomous capacity.
Saudi Aramco remains the preferred employer of a large 
number of young and ambitious Saudi graduates; its 
managers and engineers are held in high esteem in the 
international petroleum business. from about the 1970s, 
however, it lost some of its pre-eminence in national 
development as the rest of the state apparatus grew and 
could take on new public service tasks on the back of 
rapidly growing oil revenues.
This trend now seems to have been reversed: while the 
Saudi state has continued to grow, policy challenges have 
grown even faster and Aramco is once again at the fore-
front of social and economic development outside of the 
hydrocarbons sector. This is partially an outcome of higher 
oil income and increased demands on the part of govern-
ment and the royal leadership, but is also driven by a more 
assertive vision of the company’s role developed under the 
chief executive officer (CEO) since 2009, Khaled al-faleh.
Between the 1970s and 1990s Aramco had mostly limited 
itself to operating the Kingdom’s upstream hydrocarbons 
sector and a number of refineries, managing parts of the 
Eastern Province infrastructure, and providing services in 
health and education as part of its corporate social respon-
sibility programmes.
The list of new projects, sectors and tasks has grown 
exponentially during the last decade, however. Aramco has 
decided to expand strongly into petrochemicals through 
world-scale joint ventures with Sumitomo and Dow. 
According to Al-faleh, planned investment amounts to $60 
billion and the ambition is to be among the top three 
petrochemicals companies worldwide. Aramco has also 
stepped up its refinery-building programme and aims to 
become the world’s largest refiner. It has also started to 
invest in renewables technology – on a much smaller scale, 
but with potentially strategic long-term impact, given Saudi 
Arabia’s ambitious renewable energy plans.
Aramco is also trying to redefine its role in its upstream 
core business. While it generally has been a (capable) 
consumer of international technology, it now wants to 
become a technology leader. It has invested strongly in its 
research and development capacity, building up partner-
ships with international universities and research centres 
in Houston, Massachusetts and Saudi Arabia. Its new 
technology venture capital arm, Saudi Aramco Energy 
Ventures, recently identified Norwegian partners with 
which it will invest up to $120 million a year in European 
start-up companies. The company also set up its own 
commodity-trading arm in January 2012. Plans for a $4 
billion shipyard joint venture with the South Korean 
shipping company STX were reported in March 2012.
Of potentially greater importance for Saudi Arabia’s future, 
Aramco is also getting increasingly involved in industrial 
development outside of hydrocarbons and heavy industry. 
The government has asked it to be the lead agent on 
developing Jizan Economic City, a struggling project in 
Saudi Arabia’s underdeveloped south built around a 
refinery for which no private investors were found. While 
the Jizan project might have been imposed on the company 
(and apparently will require the commercially questionable 
shipping of crude oil around the Arabian Peninsula), 
Aramco is also proactively pushing for the development of 
downstream manufacturing through industrial parks 
attached to its large petrochemicals projects with Dow and 
Sumitomo. Together with the Ministry of Petroleum, it is 
furthermore attempting to push national industrialists – 
who rely on Aramco’s cheap gas and oil products as 
feedstock – away from basic petrochemicals and the 
energy-intensive manufacturing of basic building materials 
towards higher value-added production.
The company has also stepped up its support for Saudi 
small and medium-sized enterprises and entrepreneurship 
through a variety of training and financing initiatives. While 
its own workforce remains comparatively slim – 56,000 em-
ployees in 2011, a fairly small number by the standards of 
large OPEC producers – its role in training has become 
huge. It invests considerably in internal staff development, 
with more than 3,000 industrial workers undergoing 
training in 2012 and more than 1,000 Aramcons studying on 
scholarships in the U.S.
The need to accommodate these new graduates appears to 
be one of CEO Al-faleh’s core concerns and drives some of 
the activism pushing Aramco into new business fields. The 
training programmes also reflect a renewed commitment 
to shaping the Kingdom’s young managerial elites, which 
had been somewhat thinned out in the austere 1980s and 
1990s when resources for overseas scholarships had 
dwindled. 
Outside of employee training, the company has launched a 
“youth enrichment” programme in co-operation with 
various local organisations under which 2 million Saudis 
are supposed to be trained by 2020. King Abdullah also 
tasked Aramco with setting up the King Abdullah University 
of Science and Technology from 2009 onwards, which is a 
selective graduate institute with an endowment of $10 
billion (which initially was outside the control of the 
Ministry of Higher Education).
3finally, Aramco is trying to grow its broader policy research 
capacity: in 2008 it was put in charge of the King Abdullah 
Petroleum Studies and research Centre, a national energy 
think tank. At the same time it is building an internal 
economic and energy research department to assist in 
defining its national development role. 
Saudi Aramco is the most capable organisation in Saudi 
Arabia. On an individual basis, for many of the development 
tasks it has taken on – or been charged with – it is indeed a 
good choice. The question is whether the breadth of all its 
tasks combined might become overwhelming, dilute the 
managerial focus of the company and lead to a “mission 
creep” of ever-expanding follow-up tasks. The answer to 
this is not obvious, but it is a question to keep in mind when 
watching the company over the coming years. When 
Aramco was tasked with the building of a stadium and 
sports city in Jeddah in 2009 – when other government 
agencies were apparently not perceived to be up to the task 
– some observers already wondered whether it was being 
turned into a surrogate government.
Aramco has an unparalleled track record on building and 
managing large physical infrastructure. It remains to be 
seen how astute its engineers will prove to be in navigating 
the treacherous waters of domestic energy reform, indus-
trial policy or educational modernisation. One of the 
company’s core strengths has always been that of being 
perceived as separate from politics in riyadh (and, indeed, 
parts of its management are blissfully unaware of the 
goings-on among riyadh-based elites). This stance will be 
harder to maintain as Aramco takes on more government 
tasks and it runs the risk of coming under public attack.
In the wake of a minor corruption scandal involving Aramco 
and the U.S. valves company Tyco in 2012, several op-eds in 
the Saudi press criticised Aramco in an unusually open 
way. As one editorialist complained, “Aramco is a shielded 
fortress and nobody knows what is going on inside”. This 
state of affairs will be harder to maintain as the company 
gets more directly involved in national development.
Aramco now has important and visible stakes in industrial 
diversification; domestic energy reform; national employ-
ment; entrepreneurship; and secondary, vocational and 
higher education. It has become a political player, but it is 
not run by politicians: its senior management below the 
topmost level consist primarily of engineers who are 
instinctively careful and probably lacking the appetite to get 
involved in more controversial policy fields or the experi-
ence to defend the company’s interests publicly.
Much will depend on the top leadership. CEO Al-faleh was 
born in 1960, which makes him quite young by Saudi 
standards. He is generally given high grades and could stay 
in his position for a long time – but he might also become 
minister of petroleum once Ali al-Naimi retires: the latter 
was born in 1935 and has repeatedly expressed his wish to 
step down. The choice of Al-faleh’s successor would be 
one of the most important personnel decisions of the 
coming decades in the Kingdom, possibly more important 
than the choice of minister of petroleum. None of Aramco’s 
tasks is impossible to accomplish through politically astute 
leadership, but these tasks have become radically more 
demanding and require not only great managerial talent, 
but also great political talent.
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